In the shadow of escalating global tensions, the Dutch government has seized control of Nexperia, a key player in the semiconductor industry owned by Chinese firm Wingtech Technology. This dramatic intervention, announced on October 12, 2025, marks a pivotal moment where national security trumps foreign investment in Europe’s tech landscape. As the chip war between the United States and China intensifies, the Nexperia nationalization emerges as a stark symbol of Europe’s eroding autonomy, with Washington increasingly steering continental policy from afar.
The stakes could not be higher in this new front of the global semiconductor war. Nexperia produces essential chips for automotive and consumer electronics sectors, making its stability vital for Europe’s supply chains. Yet, beneath the surface, this move underscores a broader theme: the dominance of U.S. interests in shaping Europe tech sovereignty, forcing the continent to prioritize alliance loyalty over independent economic strategy.
Historical and Political Context
Nexperia, originally spun off from Philips in 2016 and acquired by China’s Wingtech Technology in 2019, specializes in discrete semiconductors and power management solutions used in everything from electric vehicles to smartphones. Its deep ties to China have long raised eyebrows, especially as Wingtech faces U.S. export restrictions for allegedly facilitating access to sensitive chip technology. Controversy escalated in 2022 when the UK forced Nexperia to divest its Newport Wafer Fab acquisition over national security fears linked to Chinese ownership.
Previous U.S. pressure campaigns have profoundly influenced European policy decisions in the semiconductor arena. For instance, the Netherlands, home to lithography giant ASML, has repeatedly restricted exports of advanced chipmaking equipment to China at Washington’s urging, including tightened controls in 2023 and 2024. Similarly, the Huawei saga saw Europe align with U.S. bans on 5G technology from the Chinese firm, prioritizing transatlantic security over bilateral trade.
This latest move with Nexperia fits seamlessly into Washington’s overarching strategy to restrict China’s access to advanced chip technology and expertise. By placing Wingtech on its entity list in 2024, the U.S. Commerce Department has compelled allies to scrutinize Chinese-linked firms, effectively creating a web of export controls that extends to Europe. The Dutch intervention, while framed domestically, echoes this playbook, aiming to safeguard critical knowledge from potential transfer to Beijing.
Europe’s Dilemma
At its core, the official justification for the Nexperia nationalization centers on “economic security,” specifically citing acute governance shortcomings that threaten the continuity of vital technological capabilities in Europe. Dutch officials invoked the rarely used Goods Availability Act in September 2025 to prevent scenarios where Nexperia’s chips might become unavailable during crises, particularly impacting the automotive industry. However, this rationale starkly contrasts with the visible reality of U.S. influence, as the timing aligns with broader Western efforts to decouple high-tech supply chains from China.
The European Union’s lack of a unified industrial and security policy exacerbates this vulnerability, leaving individual member states like the Netherlands exposed to external pressures. Without a cohesive EU framework for semiconductor policy, nations must navigate bilateral alliances and global trade rules piecemeal, often yielding to the more assertive U.S. agenda. This patchwork approach hinders Europe’s ability to foster its own champions in the chip sector, such as through the EU Chips Act, which aims for 20% global market share by 2030 but struggles against geopolitical headwinds.
Investor confidence in the European chip sector faces significant risks from such interventions, as foreign firms may hesitate to invest amid fears of sudden state overreach. The move could deter future Chinese capital while signaling to U.S. investors that Europe is a safer bet, potentially stifling innovation and long-term competitiveness. Ultimately, this erodes the sector’s dynamism, positioning Europe as a battleground rather than a leader in semiconductor policy.
Global Reactions
Beijing’s response to the Nexperia nationalization has been swift and indignant, with Wingtech publicly decrying the Dutch action as “politically motivated” and rooted in “geopolitical bias” rather than genuine security concerns. The Chinese firm warned of potential retaliation and accused the West of double standards, especially given Europe’s reliance on Chinese manufacturing for other tech components. Wingtech’s shares plunged 10% on the Shanghai Stock Exchange immediately following the announcement, reflecting broader market outrage in China.
In contrast, reactions from The Hague and Brussels have remained measured and procedural. Dutch officials emphasized that production at Nexperia continues uninterrupted, with the intervention limited to blocking harmful corporate decisions for up to a year, while inviting legal challenges. The EU, through its economic affairs channels, has expressed cautious support for member states’ security measures but stopped short of endorsing the specifics, highlighting internal divisions on China policy. Washington, though silent officially, likely views the outcome with satisfaction, as it advances the U.S.-China rivalry goals without direct American involvement.
These developments threaten to reshape trade relations between Europe and China, particularly in high-tech sectors like semiconductors. China may impose reciprocal restrictions on European firms, echoing its recent rare earth export curbs tied to U.S. actions. For Europe, this risks supply chain disruptions and lost market access, further entangling the continent in the U.S.-China rivalry.
Analysis: What It Means for Europe
The Nexperia episode reveals the profound erosion of Europe’s independent voice in tech policy, as member states increasingly defer to U.S. strategic imperatives. What began as domestic governance concerns has evolved into a de facto alignment with Washington’s containment strategy, underscoring how transatlantic ties now dictate even routine industrial decisions. This pattern diminishes Europe’s leverage in global forums, reducing its role from innovator to enforcer in the chip war.
Nationalization through tools like the Goods Availability Act represents a new era of “strategic obedience” to U.S. directives, where European governments preemptively act to appease allies and avoid sanctions. Unlike full expropriations, this intervention allows oversight without outright seizure, but it still signals a willingness to sacrifice economic openness for security alignment. Such obedience may secure short-term U.S. favor but at the cost of Europe’s strategic autonomy in critical technologies.
Moreover, the risk of further fragmentation within the EU looms large over its China policy. While the Netherlands pushes aggressive measures, other members like Germany, with heavy reliance on Chinese markets, may resist, leading to inconsistent enforcement of semiconductor policy. This discord weakens the bloc’s bargaining power, making it harder to pursue initiatives like the European Chips Act amid diverging national interests.
In essence, Europe is becoming a pawn in a two-power game it cannot control, squeezed between U.S. dominance and Chinese economic might. The Nexperia case exemplifies how continental sovereignty in the chip war is slipping away, traded for illusory security guarantees.
As the dust settles on this intervention, one question lingers: can Europe reclaim its technological destiny, or will it continue as a reluctant participant in the U.S.-China showdown? The global chip race demands bold, unified action from the EU, lest the continent’s innovation engine grind to a halt under foreign dictates. Stakeholders must weigh the costs of compliance against the perils of isolation, pondering whether true sovereignty lies in alliance or independence.